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
ABSTRACT 
 
The global financial crisis (GFC) has placed the creditworthiness of banks under intense 
scrutiny. In particular, capital adequacy has been called into question. Current capital 
requirements make no allowance for capital erosion caused by movements in the market 
value of assets. This paper examines default probabilities of Swiss banks under extreme 
conditions using structural modeling techniques. Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) and 
conditional probability of default (CPD) techniques are used to measure capital erosion. 
Significant increase in probability of default (PD) is found during the GFC period. The 
market asset value based approach indicates a much higher PD than external ratings 
indicate. Capital adequacy recommendations are formulated which distinguish between 
real and nominal capital based on asset fluctuations. 
. 

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1.  Introduction 
 
Switzerland is one of the world’s most important banking centres, with an enviable 
reputation for prudency and discreetness. Besides the United States, it is the only 
country to have two cities, Geneva and Zurich, achieve a top 10 ranking by the Global 
Financial Centres Index (ZYen and the City of London, 2009). The banking industry is 
of crucial importance to Switzerland. The Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank 
(SNB), note in their Financial Stability Report (2009) that the banking sector’s total 
assets amount to 8 times GDP, the largest ratio of all the G10 countries. In comparison, 
the United States has a ratio of approximately 1x GDP and the UK 4x.  
 
The Swiss banking sector, as reported by the SNB (2009), has 4 main categories of 
banks. Firstly, the sector is dominated by two big banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, which 
make up 76% of total banking sector asset values but only 34% domestic lending share 
due to their large international presence.  Then there are 24 Cantonal banks with a 
domestic lending market share of 34%.  367 independent bank members of the 
Raiffeisen group and 75 regional banks make up the balance of the sector. 
 
In line with the global banking industry, Switzerland banks have been severely affected 
by the financial crisis, with large losses incurred by the major banks. Globally, 
governments have introduced measures to support troubled banks. Examples include the 
2008 US $700bn Troubled Asset Relief (TARP) programme and the 2008 UK £500bn 
financial support package. In Switzerland, rescue has primarily surrounded the largest 
bank, UBS. In 2008 a package was put together to allow a SFr6bn capital injection into 
UBS and the transfer of USD $60bn of troubled assets to a special purpose vehicle of 
the SNB. 
 
Regulators in Switzerland have moved to shore up capital adequacy requirements. The 
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) has introduced capital 
adequacy requirements for the big banks above the minimum required by Basel, as well 
as a minimum leverage ratio of 3%, measured as Tier 1 capital to total assets (this ratio 
was 2.9% for Credit Suisse at end 2008, and 1.6% for UBS). These new requirements 
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are to be implemented by 2013. It is expected that in good times the ratios will be well 
above these minimum levels. 
 
Leverage in European banks is typically high compared to US banks. The aggregated 
equity of Swiss banks in this study is 3.5% of total assets, compared to 4.2% for a pool 
of the world’s 20 largest non-Swiss banks. US banks in the pool have an equity ratio of 
7.1%, Asian banks 3.6%, UK banks 4.4%, and other European banks 3.2%. The big two 
Swiss banks have a smaller combined equity ratio (2.8%) than the remaining Swiss 
banks (6.5%). Tier 1 Capital ratio to risk weighted assets is 11.5% for the combined big 
Swiss banks and total capital to risk weighted assets is 15.6%. These ratios are higher 
than for either US or UK banks, indicating a lower risk weighting is being applied by 
Swiss banks.  
 
Concerns over high leverage and major differences between risk weighted and absolute 
ratios have led to concerns over the Basel approach. The SNB has been at the forefront 
of calls for a leverage ratio to be introduced by Basel. Blum (2007) argued, that despite 
a leverage ratio being a blunt instrument which does not differentiate between risk 
profiles of banks, it has the advantage of inducing truthful risk reporting where 
supervisors have a limited ability to identify or sanction dishonest banks. Hildebrand 
(2008) views excessive leverage as a main cause of financial fragility. He views a 
simple leverage ratio as a safety valve against shortcomings of risk weighted 
adjustments, and ensuring a minimal capital buffer is maintained against unexpected 
losses and underestimation of risk. 
 
Others have expressed concerns that reducing asset values in times of crisis reduce 
equity levels. The Bank of England (2008) is concerned that not only do asset values 
reduce in times of uncertainty, but rising default probabilities make it more likely that 
assets have to be liquidated at market values, providing a need for increased capital.   
 
The linkage between asset values, economic cycles and default probabilities is discussed 
by several authors. Examples include the structural models of Merton (1974) and KMV 
(Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) which incorporate asset value fluctuations and which are dealt 
with in depth in this paper. Jarrow (2001)  incorporates equity prices into the estimation 
of default probabilities, where recovery rates and default probabilities are correlated and 
depend on the state of the macroeconomy. Using structural analysis which incorporates 
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market fluctuations based on CVaR, Allen and Powell (2009) find that there is no 
significant correlation between industry default probabilities from year to year, and the 
authors (Powell & Allen, 2009) find no significant correlation between those industries 
which had high default probabilities prior to the financial crisis and those which have 
high default probabilities subsequent to the onset of the crisis.   
 
This study focuses on the impact of fluctuating asset values on default probabilities and 
capital adequacy of Swiss banks. This is compared to a ‘pool’ of Global banks. In 
particular, the study uses CVaR to measure the most extreme of asset value fluctuations. 
 
Section 2 outlines the benefits and contributions of the study, followed by a discussion 
on VaR and CVaR in Section 3. PD is discussed in Section 4, giving consideration to 
Basel measurements for banks, and the structural models of Merton and KMV. Data and 
Methodology are discussed in Section 5. Results are presented in Section 6, which also 
includes an examination of whether current bank credit ratings are consistent with PD 
values. Conclusions are provided in Section 7, which also includes recommendations 
for a revised capital adequacy framework based on our findings. 
 
The study does not make any representations about default probabilities of any 
individual banks. It is also noted that default probabilities calculated using structural 
methodology are based on available balance sheet and equity price information, and do 
not take into account external options available to banks for reducing default probability 
such as additional capital raising or government intervention. 
 
2.  Contribution and Benefits of the Study 
 
Firstly, the study can benefit regulators and banks by providing new credit risk and 
capital adequacy methodologies which measure extreme risk.  Not only is risk being 
measured during the extreme conditions of the global financial crisis, but asset values 
are being measured at their utmost fluctuation levels using CVaR. It is during adverse 
conditions when default is most likely to occur. 
 
Secondly, the techniques are not only applicable to banks themselves, but can also be 
applied to corporate borrowers in assessing default probabilities. 
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Thirdly, CVaR is incorporated into PD calculations using the unique CPD methodology 
of the authors. A novel concept introduced in this study is the use of VaR and CVaR 
techniques to distinguish between real and nominal capital, and to formulate capital 
adequacy recommendations based on real equity levels. 
 
Finally, the study provides insight into how the Swiss banking industry has been 
affected by extreme asset fluctuations.      
 
3. VaR and CVaR 
 
VaR is well understood and widely applied by the banking industry for measuring 
market risk and determining capital adequacy. VaR measures potential losses at a given 
level of confidence for a specific time period. There is extensive literature coverage on 
VaR. Examples include Jorion (1996), RiskMetricsTM (1996), as well as 
comprehensive discussion of VaR by more than seventy recognised authors in the VaR 
Modeling Handbook and the VaR Implementation Handbook (2009a, 2009b). 
 
VaR has received widespread criticism since the onset of the global financial crisis. The 
banking industry is perceived to have placed overreliance on VaR models which focus 
on historical losses and which do not incorporate a measure of tail risk. Well before the 
financial crisis, VaR was found to have shortcomings.  Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, & Heath 
(1999; 1997) found VaR to have certain undesirable mathematical properties; such as 
lack of sub-additivity, convexity and monotonicity. Analysts at Standard & Poor’s 
(Samanta, Azarchs, & Hill, 2005) found VaR to have severe limitations which they 
believe could lull a company into a false sense of security. They report that VaR does 
not provide consistent measures of risk appetite across institutions due to varying 
assumptions used in its calculation. In addition VaR ignores tail risk, which is especially 
important under abnormal market conditions, and the S&P analysts report that VaR 
should ideally be used in conjunction with other measures.  
 
One such other measure which does measure tail risk is CVaR. CVaR measures losses 
beyond VaR. If VaR is measured at the 95% confidence level, then CVaR measures the 
tail 5% returns. In addition to measuring losses beyond VaR, CVaR has been proved to 
be a coherent risk measure (Pflug, 2000), which does not demonstrate the undesirable 
5 
 
mathematical properties of VaR. A number of papers apply CVaR to portfolio 
optimization problems; see for example Rockafeller and Uryasev (2002; 2000), 
Andersson et.al (2000), Alexander, Coleman & Li (2003), Alexander and Baptista 
(2003),  Rockafellar et al (2006) and Menoncin (2009). 
 
4. Probability of Default 
 
We commence this section with a discussion on Basel requirements for bank 
counterparties as per the Bank for International Settlements (2004). We then discuss the 
background to the structural methodology used in this study.  
 
4.1. Basel and Bank Exposures 
Basel requires banks to calculate Tier 1 and Total Capital, and apply these as a 
percentage of risk weighted assets. For bank counterparties, risk weightings can be 
calculated using either the Standardised or Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach.  The 
standardised approach relies on external ratings for corporates and banks, with lower 
weightings applied to some bank categories as compared to corporates. This is shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1 to be placed about here 
 
A range of adjustments are applied according to circumstances. For example, lending 
fully secured by residential property is weighted at 35%, and secured by commercial 
property 100%. Past due loans are weighted at 100 - 150% depending on specific 
provisions.   
 
Banks using an IRB approach must use it across the entire banking group. For 
corporate, sovereign, and bank exposures, data under the advanced approach must cover 
one business cycle but must in any case be at least 7 years. The capital requirement (K) 
is calculated as a function of: 
 
P Probability of default (also often referred to as PD) 
LGD Loss given default 
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EA Exposure at default 
M Effective maturity (in some cases) 
 
This approach has two levels – the foundation approach and the advanced approach. 
Under the foundation approach, banks generally provide their own P and rely on 
supervisory estimates for other components. Under the advanced approach, banks 
generally provide more of their own estimates of P, LGD, EA, M, subject to meeting 
certain standards. 
 
4.2. Structural Models and PD 
Using the option pricing methodology of Black & Scholes (1973), the Merton (1974) 
structural model assumes that the firm has one single debt issue and one single equity 
issue. The debt (D) is consistent with a zero coupon bond that matures at time (T). The 
initial position (asset value) of the firm is: 
A0 = E0 + D0           (1) 
 
The value of the firm V0 = A0. At T, the firm pays off the bond and the remaining equity 
is paid to the shareholders. The firm defaults if the debt obligation exceeds the asset 
value of the firm at T. In this case the bondholders take ownership of the firm and the 
shareholders get nothing (due to limited liability of shareholders the amount will not be 
negative).  The amount paid to bondholders = b. Equity at T (remaining value payable 
to the shareholders) is as follows: 
ET = VT - b        (2) 
 
Where the debt value is greater than the asset value, then ET = 0. Thus the value of a 
firm’s stock at debt maturity: 
ET  = max(AT – b, 0)       (3) 
 
This is the same as the payoff of a call option on the firm’s value with strike price b. A 
call option is an option contract that gives the holder the right to buy a certain quantity 
(usually 100 shares) of an underlying security from the writer of the option, at a 
specified price (the strike price) up to a specified date (the expiration date).    
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If, at T, assets exceed loans, the owners will exercise the option to repay the loans and 
keep the residual as profit. If loans exceed assets, then the option will expire 
unexercised and the owners (who have limited liability) default. The call option is in the 
money where AT – b > 0, and out the money where AT – b < 0. 
 
Under the KMV model, Probability of Default PD is a function of the distance to 
default DD (number of standard deviations between the value of the firm and the debt) 
determined by using the market value of assets (A), less the amount of  debt (b) divided 
by the volatility of assets .             (4) 
 
PD can be determined using the normal distribution. For example, if DD = 2 standard 
deviations, we know there is a 95% probability that assets will vary between 1 and two 
standard deviations. There is a 2.5% probability that they will fall by more than 2 
standard deviations.  
 
KMV find that the normal distribution approach followed by Merton results in PD 
values much smaller than defaults observed in practice. KMV has a large worldwide 
database from which to provide empirically based Estimated Default Frequencies 
(EDF). For example, KMV finds that historical data shows that firms with a DD of 4 
have an average default rate of approximately 1% and therefore assign an EDF of 1% to 
firms with this DD. By comparison, the normal distribution approach yields a PD of 
almost 0 for this DD. (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003).  
 
In KMV, b is taken as the value of all short-term liabilities (one year and under) plus 
half the book value of all long term debt outstanding. T is usually set as 1 year. 
 
Thus the KMV model consists of 3 steps. Firstly, estimate market value and volatility of 
firm’s assets. Secondly, calculate distance to default. Thirdly, match distance to default 
to an empirically obtained EDF.  
 
Merton assumes that asset values are log normally distributed. Distance to default and 
probability of default are calculated as:  
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T
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V
V
σ
σµ )5.0()/ln( 2−+
=
     (5) 
 
PD = N(-DD)         (6) 
where 
 V = market value of firms debt 
 F = face value of firm’s debt 
 µ  = an estimate of the annual return (drift) of the firm’s assets  
 N = cumulative standard normal distribution function. 
 
Different aspects of credit risk using structural methodology have been examined by 
several authors, such as extreme risk (Allen & Powell, 2007a, 2007b), asset correlation 
(Cespedes, 2002; Kealhofer & Bohn, 1993; Lopez, 2004; Vasicek, 1987; Zeng & 
Zhang, 2001), predictive value and validation (Bharath & Shumway, 2004; Stein, 
2002), fixed income modeling (D'Vari, Yalamanchili, & Bai, 2003), default 
probabilities and capital (Bischel & Blum, 2004) and the effect of default risk on equity 
returns (Chan, Faff, & Koffman, 2008; Gharghori, Chan, & Faff, 2007; Vassalou & 
Xing, 2002).  
 
5.  Data and Methodology 
5.1. Data 
The study compares Swiss banks to a ‘pool’ of global banks. 15 years of equity data is 
obtained from Datastream, together with current balance sheet data on equity and debt. 
Swiss banks include listed banks for which equity prices and Worldscope balance sheet 
data are available in Datastream. This involves 24 Swiss banks with total assets of CHF 
4.5 trillion. The “pool” comprises the 20 largest banks in the world (aside from Swiss 
banks and also excluding Chinese banks for which an insufficient length of data is 
available). The “pool” is summarised in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 to be placed about here 
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 5.2 VaR and CVaR  Methodology 
We use the parametric method of RiskMetrics (J.P. Morgan & Reuters, 1996) who 
introduced and popularised VaR. We calculate the logarithm of price relatives every day 
for each bank for the past 15 years. Based on a normal distribution, the standard 
deviation is multiplied by 1.645 to obtain VaR at 95% confidence level. As we are not 
calculating VaR for investment purposes, we do not need to show the effect of portfolio 
diversification. We therefore use an undiversified approach, whereby total VaR is the 
weighted average of the individual bank VaRs. CVaR is calculated as the average of the 
worst 5% of returns, i.e., returns beyond VaR. 
  
5.3. Structural Methodology 
We apply the Merton methodology discussed in Section 4.2. An initial estimation for 
asset returns is made using the equity volatility obtained in section 5.2 and multiplying 
it by equity as a percentage of asset value. The daily log return is calculated and new 
asset values estimated. This is applied for every day. Following KMV, this process is 
repeated until asset returns converge.    
 
In order to measure DD at the most extreme of the asset value fluctuations, we also 
incorporate CVaR methodology into the structural model. Prior applications of this 
methodology have been applied to Australian sectoral analysis and US and UK banks 
(Allen & Powell, 2009a, 2009b; Powell & Allen, 2009a, 2009b). We substitute the 
standard deviation of all returns with the standard deviation applying to the most 
extreme 5% of returns (CStdev) to calculate a conditional DD (CDD) and conditional 
PD (CPD) as follows:   
 
TCStdev
TFVCDD
V
V )5.0()/ln( 2σµ −+
=
     (7) 
 
CPD=N(-DD)       (8) 
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6. Results 
 
Table 3 to be placed about here 
 
VaR and CVaR results are summarised in Table 3 which shows how both VaR and 
CVaR reduce over the boom times in the mid 2000’s and then spike during the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) period, dramatically so in 2008. It is also interesting to note that 
volatility is noticeably lower for Swiss banks during the GFC period. CVaR is much 
higher than VaR, especially during the GFC period. Figure 1 illustrates these trends 
with 3 point polynomial trend lines.     
 
 Figure 1 to be placed about here 
 
Up to this point, we have only focused on fluctuations in equity values, which are an 
important component of default probability. We now analyse the results of our 
structural modeling. This is summarised in Table 4. 
 
 Table 4 to be placed about here 
 
Both the Pool and Swiss banks show a dramatic jump in default probabilities in 2008, 
with DD falling below one standard deviation, although the PD is slightly lower for 
Swiss banks. CPD values exceed 40% for Swiss and Pool banks. Swiss DD and CPD 
trends are shown in Figure 2 and compared to the Pool in Figure 3. 
 
 Figures 2 and 3 to be placed about here 
 
Swiss banks show a fairly similar default trend to the pool (for DD and CPD), with DD 
increasing during the mid-2000’s and decreasing dramatically during the GFC. Whilst 
in earlier years, default distance was further than the pool, this has narrowed during the 
mid to late 2000’s.  However, if we analyse the components of distance to default, then 
we see this similarity in default distances between Swiss and Pool banks is caused by 
different factors. DD is a function of two key components: leverage and asset volatility. 
For example, in a bank with equity of 10%, if market value of assets reduces by 10% 
then the default line is breached.  
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 Figure 4 to be placed about here 
  
Figure 4 shows the relationship between equity, market value of assets and DD. In 2008 
DD levels for Pool and Swiss banks are very similar. Pool market equity is 
approximately 10% with Swiss market equity approximately 8%. Therefore Swiss 
banks have a shorter distance to travel to default. However, Swiss Asset VaR is lower. 
Asset VaR peaks in 2008 at approximately 6% for the pool, and 4% for Swiss banks. 
The combination of lower market equity, lower VaR for Swiss banks results in a similar 
DD to the higher capital, higher VaR combination of Pool banks.  
 
Standard & Poor’s (2008), provide transition default probabilities associated with credit 
ratings. Almost all the banks in our sample of Swiss and Pool banks carry a credit rating 
above BBB, equating to transition to default probabilities of less than 0.5% for 2008. 
This is significantly lower than the default calculated in Table 4 based on fluctuating 
asset values. 
 
We now examine impacts of market movements on capital adequacy. If market asset 
values reduce by 10% (VaR is 10%), then in real terms capital also reduces by 10%. 
Current capital requirements for banks are based on book values (nominal values) as 
opposed to market values (real values). Therefore real capital (Kr) can be measured as 
nominal capital requirement (K) less market asset VaR. Alternatively, Asset CVaR 
(CStdev) can be used, giving a more conservative measure, shown for Company x as 
follows: 
Krx = Kx – CStdevx       (9) 
 
Current nominal capital requirements are designed to cover credit risk and market risk 
associated with operations, not asset value fluctuations. Therefore to cover these asset 
value movements, required capital (K*) should be increased by the fluctuating asset 
value. For Company x, this is depicted as follows: 
K*x = Kx + CStdevx       (10) 
 
The relationship between real and nominal capital is shown in figures 5.  
 
Figure 5 to be placed about here  
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7.  Summary and Conclusions    
  
Four key observations are made from the results. Firstly VaR, CVaR, DD and CPD all 
follow a similar trend. Risk is moderately high during the early 2000’s reducing 
substantially during the mid 2000’s and increasing dramatically during the GFC.  
 
Second, Swiss banks show similar default levels to the Pool. However this is brought 
about through a combination of lower equity and lower asset value fluctuations as 
compared to the pools higher equity and higher asset value fluctuations.  
 
Third, default probabilities based on fluctuating asset values are much higher than 
default probabilities shown by external credit ratings.  
 
Fourth, asset value fluctuations have severely eroded bank equity during the GFC. In 
real terms capital adequacy is poor, and nominal capital needs a significant boost.  
 
The results of this study provide a strong case for capital adequacy reform. Leverage 
ratios are certainly a step in the right direction, however, the setting of a leverage level 
needs to factor in moving asset values. It is of course not practical to have continuously 
fluctuating capital requirements. However, it is strongly recommended that the required 
capital adequacy level is based on an assessment over time of real, as opposed to 
nominal capital. CStdev is recommended as a good method for assessing real capital 
requirements (as per figure 5), given that it measures tail risk, and extreme 
circumstances are when banks are most likely to fail.   
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1.  Basel II Risk Weights   
 
Credit 
assessment 
AAA to 
AA- 
A+ to A- BBB+ to 
BB- 
BB+ to 
B- 
Below 
BB- 
Unrated 
Corporate 
Risk 
Weight 
20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100% 
Bank Risk 
Weight 
20% 50% 50% 100% 150% 50% 
Basel Capital requirements are based on capital (Tier 1 and Total capital) as a percentage of risk weighted 
assets. The percentages show the risk weightings that must be applied to the assets for the purpose of 
calculating capital allocation. The Corporate risk weightings do not include exposures to small business. 
The bank risk weightings are those that must be applied to Bank counterparties. 
(Compiled from Bank for International Settlements, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  “Pool” of Banks Used in This Study 
 
 Region Number of  Banks Assets USD $tr 
U.S. 4  6.04 
U.K. 4  4.66 
Other European 9 16.86 
Asian 3  4.91 
There are 20 Banks included in our Banking Pool. This consists of the world’s largest non-Swiss Banks. 
Chinese banks are also excluded, due to insufficient length of equity information. A full listing of Swiss 
and Pool banks is contained in Appendix 1.  
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Table 3. VaR and CVaR - Results Summary 
 
 Swiss Banks Pool 
 Daily VaR Daily CVaR Daily VaR Daily CVaR 
2008 0.0791 0.1117 0.1127 0.1584 
2007 0.0418 0.0609 0.0444 0.0597 
2006 0.0195 0.0272 0.0176 0.0249 
2005 0.0213 0.0301 0.0192 0.0266 
2004 0.0143 0.0190 0.0154 0.0215 
2003 0.0194 0.0261 0.0206 0.0283 
2002 0.0364 0.0515 0.0352 0.0481 
2001 0.0402 0.0569 0.0437 0.0621 
2000 0.0369 0.0544 0.0412 0.0573 
1999 0.0278 0.0398 0.0396 0.0534 
1998 0.0293 0.0386 0.0393 0.0524 
1997 0.0474 0.0716 0.0494 0.0706 
1996 0.0276 0.0386 0.0361 0.0504 
1995 0.0174 0.0270 0.0242 0.0336 
1994 0.0175 0.0236 0.0256 0.0353 
The table shows Daily VaR and CVaR. VaR is calculated on a parametric basis, whereby the standard 
deviation of daily returns is multiplied by 1.645 (being 95% confidence level based on a normal 
distribution). Annual VaR can be obtained by multiplying Daily VaR by the square root of 250. Figures 
are undiversified and represent the weighted average of the individual Bank VaRs. CVaR is calculated as 
the average of the worst 5% of actual returns (those beyond the 95% VaR). 
 
 
 
Table 4. Distance to Default - Results Summary 
  
 Swiss Banks  Pool 
 DD PD CDD CPD  DD PD CDD CPD 
2008 0.94 0.1729 0.24 0.4037  0.68 0.2486 0.16 0.4359 
2007 1.86 0.0315 0.46 0.3215  1.87 0.0305 0.48 0.3172 
2006 4.06 0.0000 1.04 0.1491  4.66 0.0000 1.14 0.1262 
2005 3.72 0.0001 0.96 0.1691  4.12 0.0000 1.03 0.1513 
2004 5.46 0.0000 1.46 0.0723  5.28 0.0000 1.31 0.0958 
2003 4.04 0.0000 1.08 0.1406  3.60 0.0002 0.89 0.1864 
2002 2.25 0.0123 0.58 0.2820  2.15 0.0160 0.54 0.2958 
2001 1.99 0.0231 0.51 0.3054  1.84 0.0332 0.45 0.3269 
2000 2.35 0.0094 0.58 0.2817  1.88 0.0302 0.45 0.3269 
1999 2.68 0.0036 0.68 0.2471  1.93 0.0266 0.48 0.3161 
1998 2.54 0.0055 0.71 0.2400  1.95 0.0257 0.49 0.3127 
1997 1.58 0.0576 0.38 0.3518  1.55 0.0606 0.36 0.3588 
1996 2.70 0.0034 0.71 0.2403  2.12 0.0170 0.51 0.3060 
1995 4.29 0.0000 1.01 0.1570  3.16 0.0008 0.76 0.2234 
1994 4.27 0.0000 1.15 0.1246  2.99 0.0014 0.72 0.2348 
Calculations are described in Sections 4.2 and 5.3. DD shows the number of standard deviations to default 
of the market value of assets. Default occurs when the firm’s debt exceeds asset values. Debt is measured 
as current debt plus 50% of long term debt.   Prior year figures calculate the distance to default of current 
balance sheet values based on historical fluctuations in asset values. CDD and CPD are calculated as for 
DD and PD, but based on the worst 5% of asset returns.  
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The figure compares Daily VaR and CVaR between the Swiss Banks and the pool of European 
Banks using an order 3 polynomial trend line. VaR is calculated on a parametric basis, whereby the 
standard deviation of daily returns is multiplied by 1.645 (being 95% confidence level based on a normal 
distribution). Annual VaR can be obtained by multiplying Daily VaR by the square root of 250. Figures 
are undiversified and represent the weighted average of the individual Bank VaRs. CVaR is calculated as 
the average of the worst 5% of actual returns (those beyond the 95% VaR). 
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Figure 2. The figure compares Distance to Default (DD) and Conditional Distance to Default CDD of 
Swiss Banks. DD is calculated using Metrton structural methodology, and shows the number of standard 
deviations to default of the market asset of assets, with default occurring when the firm’s debt exceeds 
asset values. CDD is calculated as for DD but based on the worst 5% of asset returns. The order 3 
polynomial trendline shows how distance to default increased over the mid-2000s and reduced during the 
GFC. 
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Figure 3. The figure compares Distance to Default (DD) and Conditional Distance to Default CDD 
between Swiss Banks and the pool of European Banks. DD is calculated using Merton structural 
methodology, and shows the number of standard deviations to default of the market asset of assets, with 
default occurring when the firm’s debt exceeds asset values. CDD is calculated as for DD but based on 
the worst 5% of asset returns. The order 3 polynomial trendline shows how distance to default increased 
over the mid-2000s and reduced during the GFC. A similar trend is noted for Swiss Banks and Pool 
Banks, with pool banks showing a somewhat higher probability of default than Swiss Banks during 
downturn periods of the early 2000’s.  
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Figure 4. The figure shows market asset VaR (99% level) for years 2000 - 2008 (represented by the 
‘waves’) superimposed on bank market equity levels (represented by the ‘cones’). In this diagram we 
define market equity per KMV as the distance between market asset values and debt (debt being current 
debt plus half of long term debt). Default occurs when the wave level rises above the cone level. Using 
VaR, this comes closest to happening in 2008. If CVaR were used, the waves are at higher levels. 
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Figure 5. The top graph compares nominal capital to real capital, where real capital in this graph is 
Nominal capital (K) – Asset VaR (at 95% confidence level). Figure 6 shows the required capital to cover 
asset value fluctuations for Swiss banks. The lower graph shows required capital to cover fluctuations in 
asset values. Required capital as measured by VaR is nominal capital + VaR, and to cover extreme asset 
fluctuations is nominal capital + CVaR. 
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Appendix 1.  List of Banks Used in This Study  
 
Swiss Banks Pool Banks 
Bank CA St. Gallen Banco Santander Spain 
Bank Linth Bank of America U.S. 
Bank LLB Barclays Bank U.K. 
Bank Sarasin BNP Paribas France 
Banque Cantonale de Genève  Citigroup U.S. 
Banque Cantonale du Jura Commerzbank Germany 
Banque Cantonale Vaudoise Credit Agricole France 
Basellandschaftliche Kantonalbank Deutsche Bank Germany 
Basler Kantonalbank Dexia Belgium 
BEKB/BCBE HSBC Holdings U.K. 
Coop Bank ING Bank Netherlands 
Credit Suisse Group JP Morgan U.S. 
EFG International Lloyds TSB U.K. 
Graubündner Kantonalbank Mitsubishi UFJ Japan 
Hypothekarbank Lenzburg Mizuho Financial Group Japan 
Luzerner Kantonalbank Royal Bank of Scotland U.K. 
Neue Aargauer bank Societe Generale France 
Schwyzer Kantonalbank Sumitomo Mitsui Japan 
St.Galler Kantonalbank UniCredit Italy 
UBS AG Wells Fargo U.S. 
Valiant Bank 
VP Bank  
Walliser Kantonalbank 
Zuger Kantonalbank 
 
Swiss Banks include all listed banks for which Equity and WorldScope balance sheet data is available on 
Datastream. Pool banks include the 20 largest Global non-Swiss banks by total asset values for which 
equity and  balance sheet data is also available on Datastream. Inclusions are similar to lists of the largest 
world banks provided by other sources (BankersAlmanac, 2009; The Banker, 2009), but Chinese banks 
are excluded due to insufficient historical equity data. 
 
 
